It’s a good moment to remember the Biden-era Supreme Court Commission. As you may have heard, yesterday’s decision in Louisiana v. Callais finished the Supreme Court’s longstanding campaign against the Voting Rights Act. You can find a good breakdown of the opinions here. Two things stand out.
First, this is what juristocracy does in the American system: it subverts reconstruction politics. The VRA was the crown jewel of the Second Reconstruction—a statute reaffirmed by bipartisan supermajorities. That pedigree did not save it.
Second, the decision confirms something broader and more ominous: the Court is now positioned against virtually any institutional development that could reconstitute American democracy. Nothing plausibly on the horizon—certainly nothing post-2028—is beyond its reach. The Court hovers over the political system like our constitutional Death Star.
That much, unfortunately, is familiar. What is nonetheless uncomfortable—at least for me—is identifying where the real constraint on any democratic response lies.
It is not really the Republican Party (which is hurdling towards obsolescence). It is not even primarily the juristocrats themselves. The more durable obstacle is a bloc of centrist legalists who will oppose meaningful court reform, even now.
That is an uneasy claim to make. These are serious scholars acting in good faith. But good faith does not eliminate consequences. Over the next several years, their interventions will predictably narrow the range of what is considered “responsible,” foreclose institutional imagination, and ultimately undermine prospects for democratic renewal.
Which brings us back to the Commission.
The Commission as Deferral
During the 2020 campaign, Joe Biden promised a study of the Court—the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States—to evaluate possible reforms in light of the Barrett confirmation and the consolidation of a conservative supermajority.
From the outset, many observers suspected the Commission would function less as a vehicle for reform than as a mechanism for deferral. Its composition all but guaranteed it: prominent centrists alongside a smaller number of scholars open to structural change. The result was predictable. The Commission catalogued arguments, registered disagreement, and produced no actionable reform agenda.
In institutional terms, it succeeded. It moved court reform off the immediate political agenda at a moment when the case for action was strongest.
The Moral Problem
That history now poses a harder question.
If one believes—as I do—that decisions like Callais are not aberrations but the logical culmination of the Court’s trajectory, then the choice to stall reform in 2021 looks different in retrospect. It becomes part of the causal story.
This is the uncomfortable implication: a cohort of well-meaning legal scholars helped preserve the conditions under which the current Court could continue dismantling core pillars of American democracy. In some important respects, a lot of folks should really own Callais and the Court’s many calamities.
Saying that out loud is difficult, especially within the academy. It risks collapsing good-faith disagreement into moral indictment. That is not my intention. The point is narrower, but still serious: on what may be the defining institutional question of the moment, a generation of legal elites has been profoundly, consequentially wrong.
The Playbook Returns
What comes next will look familiar.
The same repertoire deployed during the Commission era is already reappearing. Expect sustained efforts to recast structural reform as reckless, unconstitutional, or norm-destroying. Arguments will proliferate that court expansion violates the Court’s “essential functions.” Alternatives will be proposed—oversight tweaks, procedural adjustments—that preserve the Court’s current role while gesturing toward reform. Coopting and out-and-out pushback will exist side-by-side.
These proposals will not cohere into a workable strategy. They are not meant to. Their function is delay.
The underlying dynamic is straightforward: to keep any measure that would materially constrain the Court outside the bounds of respectable debate. Sometimes this will take the form of cautionary institutionalism; sometimes it will appear as sharp criticism of the Court paired with insistence that nothing substantial can or should be done.
The effect is the same. Centrist legalism becomes the most effective defense the Roberts Court has. More effective, by a mile, than anything on offer by conservatives on X.
Morphine Politics
There is, at bottom, a mismatch between the scale of the problem and the solutions on offer.
The Court is vindicating juristocracy at the expense of democracy. The response from the center is not a competing institutional vision but a politics of reassurance: warnings about overreach, appeals to norms, incrementalism detached from the realities of partisan asymmetry.
It is, in effect, morphine. It soothes without treating the underlying condition. I assure you, there is nothing behind the centrists’ anxieties. The few that will hazard an alternative plan put forward ideas that assume a working political system that is far in the rearview mirror.
And like the Commission before it, the effect is not resolution but postponement—running out the clock while the Court continues to reshape the system.
The Open Question
The harder question is what, if anything, can counteract this dynamic.
The obstacle is not simply political opposition. It is the authority of legal expertise itself—the ability of centrist scholars to define the boundaries of the thinkable and the legitimate. That is a far more difficult problem than winning a single electoral cycle or passing a statute.
But if the lesson of Callais is that the Court will not self-limit, then the status quo is not neutral. It is a choice.
And remembering the Commission makes that choice harder to ignore.




The only hope is accelerationism at this point it seems. The court willl continue to make these decisions until there is a breaking point. There really does not seem to be a way to move past this juristocracy 😔
I've come around to thinking the 9 unelected judges who are so different from the citizens have lost any legitimacy. They think they are the sole arbiters on interpreting a constitution, not congress or the presidency. They don't even think they are accountable and they can accept bribes.
The justices are showing they don't respect the rule of law. I've come around to the view a president and congress are going to have to destroy the court as it currently exists and create something new that congress and the presidency can disagree with and can ignore if they both agree. That means the executive and congress have just as much power to interpret the constitution. Maybe even more and the supreme court can only advise.
The lower courts can keep doing what they are doing. The courts are fine. the supreme court is the problem.